Most can agree that at least a very large portion of the hard determinism/ compatibilism debate is semantics, namely a debate over what the functional definition of freedom is. I distinctly remember an article Moridin cited in one of our debates acknowledging as much, and I believe that we ultimately agreed that our dispute was primarily one of semantics. Over the past few days I've wondered if there is any non-semantical difference between the two positions. Obviously not all compatibilists believe in both determinism and free will, as it is certainly possible to assert that two hypothetical phenomenon would be compatible even if one or both are not real. Those that do accept both, however, seem to believe that man has as much freedom as hard determinists think he does. Both groups acknowledge that the individual makes his or her own choices and that these choices are merely the result of previous conditions. To use the language of my last philosophy class, they all agree that man has the freedom to do as he pleases, but lacks the ability to do otherwise. The only difference, then, is what standard we hold freedom to--is someone free if they make their own choices but ultimately only do so as part of a chain-reaction stemming from things that they cannot control?
Am I missing something, or is the hard determinism/ compatibilism debate entirely semantics?
Please consult google before asking for definitions of terms.
-------
If you're against hedonism, it's probably because you're not doing it right.
336 users online 
179196 members 
You have 1 new message.
Patron
Sustainer
Ad Free
The only non-semantical issue I can think of right now is that hard determinists argue that the fact that our behavior is cased means that responsibility does not exist, where as comaptibilists argue that the fact that our behavior is cased means that responsibility does, in fact, exist. 
