In Defense of Pantheism -- LiveWire Teen Forums

Wilder, I'd like to take this opportunity to thank you for your reply. It cleared up a few things for me.

While in practice the two often parallel one another, this isn't really true at all by definition. As my beliefs demonstrate, the supernaturalism isn't a requisite of the sacred. Similarly, that which is paranormal is not inherently properly determinative of human beliefs, actions and attitudes, specially prominent with regards to human welfare, and so on.

Alright, I think I understand this reasoning now.

Going with the idea that morality stems from logical conclusions factoring in the nature of reality and our values, I accept the fact that different people can value different things (adhere to a different or no sacred reality), leading them to different actions than myself while still basing my own actions logically upon my values and understanding of the world.

I find this to be a very good argument but I became suspicious when I noticed that it slightly confuses individualistic morality with moral subjectivism. I would like to argue that these two are not identical. In fact, this is in my opinion a very important distinction. I would further argue that this is not an example of something that is "properly meaningful or have the status of incredible importance it is it merely personal or subjective" for the very reason that individualistic morality is necessarily a form of moral realism, rather than moral subjectivism. Please turn your attention to the following moral argument that I will use to attempt to demonstrate this.

"If you value your car, you ought to change the oil"

Assume for the sake of argument that your car needs fresh oil to function and will break down or otherwise become nonfunctional if fresh oil is not supplied. I'm sure it is rather uncontroversial if I label this moral proposition as individualistic. After all, it is not based on the will of gods or governments and it is not about what is best for the collective. Here comes the question: is this statement true for everyone (universal scientific fact) or merely true for you (subjective)? The statement I wrote above is in the form of an if-then conditional. That is, if the if-clause of the proposition is true, we know that the then-clause of the proposition is also true. Granted, everyone might not value their cars. Some might even hate their cars. Does this, in of itself give us a reason to doubt or think that the proposition "If you value your car, you ought to change the oil"? I would argue that it does not, since such an argument is based on a special version of the fallacy called denying the antecedent. If you know that when it rains, the sidewalk will be wet and it is not currently raining, you cannot draw the conclusion that the statement "when it rains, the sidewalk will be wet" is false. Similarly, just because you do not personally value your car does not mean that you shouldn't change the oil if it is the case that you do, in fact, value your car.

Therefore, I conclude that the truth of the moral proposition "If you value your car, you ought to change the oil" is not subjective or depends on personal values and that your counter example is problematic.

Now, what does this have to do with anything? Well, my initial question was "how can it be properly meaningful or have the status of incredible importance it is it merely personal or subjective?" with regards to sacred reality and/or the pantheist concept of god. You have argued that you do see a place for pluralism, but I contend that this sort of pluralism is not reasonable if you at the same time wish to have some objective or concrete worldview. This will heavily tie into the arguments in the latter part of this post.

I think that our apparent conflict in views may stem from how we are using terms like emptiness and existence. When I refer to something as being empty, I'm not saying that it doesn't exist, but rather that (from the perspective of what I would refer to as sacred reality) it doesn't have an independent, individual essence. It's not so much diminishing its existence as it is acknowledging that the entirety of what it is is determined by that which it is not.

This was a large stumbling block for me. Thank you for clarifying your usage of the terms I found uncomfortable.

Yes and no. There is a clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god (empiricism, logic, and rational thought). Comparing one concept of pantheism to another can certainly be like comparing apples to oranges, though; Spinoza and I certainly mean different things when we describe the universe as God.

I find this argument quite fascinating for several reasons.

From the perspective of religious pluralism, you would probably argue that your perspective is different, yet equally valid, as that of Spinoza. What I do not understand is how can something be both different and equally (objectively) valid, without being contradictory? Or are you using a more subjective influenced definition of valid in this case?

You seem to be moving away further from mysticism and as I understand your argument, your pantheism is subject to or constrained within these various epistemologies. If your form of pantheism is subject to "empiricism, logic and rational thought" this would imply that your pantheism is subject to science and, in fact, is put forward as a scientific hypothesis of sorts. Pantheism would therefore have to be falsifiable. Can you cite any empirical discovery that would count against the basic / your pantheism conception of god? However, is it not the case that the very basics of pantheism, due to religious pluralism, can swallow, or be made consistent with any result of an empirical experiment design to falsify pantheism?

I'm unfamiliar with these terms; could you clarify them for me?

By a continuous view of the universe it is meant that you can keep dividing matter again and again and never reaching a fundamental entity that everything is made of, whereas a quantized view means that there is some basic "stuff" that cannot be divided.

All pantheist stances must, obviously, be internally coherent, but no one is claiming that the pantheisms of various schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Spinozan philosophy, the WPM, and so forth are all true

But didn't you claim earlier that you where at least partly a pluralist and that many perspectives on pantheism is different, yet equally true? Maybe I just misunderstood your position.

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"The larger the island of knowledge, the longer the
shoreline of wonder" (Ralph W. Sockman)

Now, what does this have to do with anything? Well, my initial question was "how can it be properly meaningful or have the status of incredible importance it is it merely personal or subjective?" with regards to sacred reality and/or the pantheist concept of god. You have argued that you do see a place for pluralism, but I contend that this sort of pluralism is not reasonable if you at the same time wish to have some objective or concrete worldview. This will heavily tie into the arguments in the latter part of this post.

The pluralism that I see is based upon the fact that different people have different values. While it may be an objective truth that "if you hold my pantheist conception of reality as sacred, then you should also hold [X] beliefs, etc.," I acknowledge that it is perfectly acceptable for someone to not hold my conception of pantheism as sacred.

From the perspective of religious pluralism, you would probably argue that your perspective is different, yet equally valid, as that of Spinoza. What I do not understand is how can something be both different and equally (objectively) valid, without being contradictory? Or are you using a more subjective influenced definition of valid in this case?

I'll admit that my understanding of Spinoza's single-substance monist pantheism is superficial at best, so I'll refrain from taking any hard stances towards his conclusion. I would say that we cannot make contradictory claims about reality that are both equally valid, but different ideologies can legitimately hold differing values/ ideas of what is sacred and thus have different, but also valid, beliefs as a result. In short, profane reality is objective, and we cannot make contradictory, simultaneously true claims about it. Sacred reality, however, can be subjective, as it is largely an expression of/ basis for values, and so individuals can have differing ideas of what is sacred/ sacred reality that are equally legitimate (obviously under the condition that these claims about sacred reality do not also entail false claims about physical/ profane reality--deities and afterlives immediately come to mind).

You seem to be moving away further from mysticism and as I understand your argument, your pantheism is subject to or constrained within these various epistemologies.

I wouldn't say that I'm moving away from it so much as strictly defining its place. The mystical is a path to hierophanies, a way to experience the sacred breaking through into the profane, but such a subjective experience isn't the best of tools for understanding the sacred or the profane.

If your form of pantheism is subject to "empiricism, logic and rational thought" this would imply that your pantheism is subject to science and, in fact, is put forward as a scientific hypothesis of sorts. Pantheism would therefore have to be falsifiable. Can you cite any empirical discovery that would count against the basic / your pantheism conception of god? However, is it not the case that the very basics of pantheism, due to religious pluralism, can swallow, or be made consistent with any result of an empirical experiment design to falsify pantheism?

My claims about pantheism are subject to science and empiricism because they are, in part, claims about the nature of physical reality. Elements of it such as the essential claim of non-dualism make assertions about the nature of the world; if non-dualism was falsified via empiricism/ logic then my understanding of pantheism would also be falsified. The subjective elements of my pantheism, however, (ie: the fact that I find the non-dualist conception of the universe to be sacred because it is largely incorporated into my personal values), are more difficult or impossible to falsify, because they relate to personal values rather than objective claims about reality (ergo the possibility of pluralism in a belief system that also makes objective claims about the world).

Thanks for explaining the concepts of a continuous vs. quantized universe for me. With that in mind, to return to your original question:

It seems to me that this form of thinking, that is, the idea that everything is equally subject to sunyata, would imply that reality is fundamentally continuous, rather than quantized.

Not necessarily ("necessarily" is an important word here; I believe that there are some schools of Buddhism which might disagree with me and argue that sunyata only properly applies to composite phenomena). Phenomenon are considered empty of individual essence not just because they are composed of other phenomenon but also because they are determined by them. If there was a basic fundamental and quantized entity which behaved entirely of its own accord rather than being influenced by other factors, it would be free of sunyata. If, however, this particle could not be reduced to smaller parts but still acted along deterministic lines, then it would be at least partially empty in the sense that its "nature" would be the result of that which is outside of it, not an inherent, internal essence.

But didn't you claim earlier that you where at least partly a pluralist and that many perspectives on pantheism is different, yet equally true? Maybe I just misunderstood your position.

I think that it's possible for differing perspective on pantheism to conflict and be true, but that doesn't necessarily mean that they automatically do so. For example, the World Pantheist Movement's pantheism basically boils down to your vegetarian version of sacrality; people practicing what is more or less secular humanism also find that the awe nature inspires for them creates/ expands the "spiritual" dimension of their lives. Looking at their credo, one can find both objective and subjective statements. For example,

Reverence for Nature and the wider Universe.
Celebration or our lives in our bodies on this beautiful earth as a joy and a privilege."

are things that can be true for some but not others; it's perfectly logical that some people see our planet as beautiful and sacred and others do not. In claims like this--establishing what our values and understandings of the sacred are--there is room for disagreement, because we're dealing with subjective elements. However, when they affirm:

Realism - acceptance that the external world exists independently of human consciousness or perception.
Strong naturalism, without belief in supernatural realms, afterlives, beings or forces.

They are entering into objective claims about reality, not just the subjective realm of sacred reality and values. Here differing views cannot both be true; either there is an external realm that exists independently of our perception or there isn't.

Thus it's possible that some other forms of pantheism are different from mine but equally valid; they express different values and ideas of what is sacred, but when referring to objective facts they do not conflict with my views/ reality.

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"Hey, that's not very nice, Mayor--
just because a person's gay doesn't mean he's a fag!"
-Stan

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