In response to the claim that pantheism adds nothing to the concept of the universe:
Pantheism, much like other religious terms, acts as an umbrella for a wide number of related beliefs and concepts. I will only discuss my understanding of pantheism, because attempting to cover a larger number of interpretations of it would be both irrelevant and time-consuming.
Trying to keep this as short as possible, to say that God is everything and everything is God attributes two quintessential concepts of my god to the universe:
Sacrality Religious belief is often distinguished by the presence of a dichotomy between sacred and mundane reality. God is the source of sacrality; my pantheism thus defines the universe as sacred/ the source of the sacred when it is viewed with the second attribute:
Unity Whereas "the universe" is really a list of separate things: "the sum of that which exists", God is a singular entity. For me this demarcates the boundary between the mundane reality that we live by virtue of being conscious organisms and the sacred reality of a holistic view of a non-dual universe.
In essence this is acceptance of parts of the ontology found in some forms of Buddhism (as well as some forms of Taoism, Hindiusm, Thelema, and other religions, but I'll keep things to Buddhism for simplicity's sake). I'll be simplifying/ streamlining concepts here so as to get my point across without getting bogged down in the exact details of Buddhist philosophy, which is tangentially relevant at best. The concept of sunyata teaches that all things are devoid of a permanent, self-inherent essence because they are ultimately interrelated and interdependent. The concept of determinism (I'm very thankful that you have a thorough understanding of this Moridin; it's a common stumbling block when I try to explain my beliefs to people) is very useful here: I only am everything that I am because of other things, and everything that I am/ think/ do is ultimately wholely the result of outside conditions.
Here we do run into the risk of greedy reductionism, however (I believe; I learn lots of fun terms from a combination of Moridin's posts and google). While it is true that I am a constantly-changing aggregate of various interdependent elements, I am also distinguishable as a unique human being with individual thoughts, actions, etc. The Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna, who expounded heavily upon the concept of sunyata, attempted to resolve this conflict by explaining that all phenomenon, while empty due to the fact that they arise from causes, also have a temporary or provisional existence when viewed from the worldly perspective. On one hand you are clearly an individual person, but on the other hand you are impermanent and wholly determined by that which is not you (rather than possessing an inherent and eternal essence).
The point of this long-winded digression into Buddhist philosophy is to highlight how pantheism expresses a dichotomy of sacrality and the mundane in my worldview. We (generally) exist and perceive reality from the provisional, temporary perspective. We see people, not flows of casual factors and infinite chains of interlocking events forming a singular, holistic entity. I find this second ontology, however, to be both valid and sacred. Thus, to say that "the universe is God and God is the universe" is to say that while I do perceive the universe as a category, I can also understand it as a singular entity possessed with a Unity that makes it the source of what I perceive as Sacred.
Now, what does this have to do with anything? Well, my initial question was "how can it be properly meaningful or have the status of incredible importance it is it merely personal or subjective?" with regards to sacred reality and/or the pantheist concept of god. You have argued that you do see a place for pluralism, but I contend that this sort of pluralism is not reasonable if you at the same time wish to have some objective or concrete worldview. This will heavily tie into the arguments in the latter part of this post.
From the perspective of religious pluralism, you would probably argue that your perspective is different, yet equally valid, as that of Spinoza. What I do not understand is how can something be both different and equally (objectively) valid, without being contradictory? Or are you using a more subjective influenced definition of valid in this case?
You seem to be moving away further from mysticism and as I understand your argument, your pantheism is subject to or constrained within these various epistemologies.
If your form of pantheism is subject to "empiricism, logic and rational thought" this would imply that your pantheism is subject to science and, in fact, is put forward as a scientific hypothesis of sorts. Pantheism would therefore have to be falsifiable. Can you cite any empirical discovery that would count against the basic / your pantheism conception of god? However, is it not the case that the very basics of pantheism, due to religious pluralism, can swallow, or be made consistent with any result of an empirical experiment design to falsify pantheism?
Thanks for explaining the concepts of a continuous vs. quantized universe for me. With that in mind, to return to your original question:
It seems to me that this form of thinking, that is, the idea that everything is equally subject to sunyata, would imply that reality is fundamentally continuous, rather than quantized.
But didn't you claim earlier that you where at least partly a pluralist and that many perspectives on pantheism is different, yet equally true? Maybe I just misunderstood your position.
Thus it's possible that some other forms of pantheism are different from mine but equally valid; they express different values and ideas of what is sacred, but when referring to objective facts they do not conflict with my views/ reality.
While in practice the two often parallel one another, this isn't really true at all by definition. As my beliefs demonstrate, the supernaturalism isn't a requisite of the sacred. Similarly, that which is paranormal is not inherently properly determinative of human beliefs, actions and attitudes, specially prominent with regards to human welfare, and so on.
Going with the idea that morality stems from logical conclusions factoring in the nature of reality and our values, I accept the fact that different people can value different things (adhere to a different or no sacred reality), leading them to different actions than myself while still basing my own actions logically upon my values and understanding of the world.
"If you value your car, you ought to change the oil"
Assume for the sake of argument that your car needs fresh oil to function and will break down or otherwise become nonfunctional if fresh oil is not supplied. I'm sure it is rather uncontroversial if I label this moral proposition as individualistic. After all, it is not based on the will of gods or governments and it is not about what is best for the collective. Here comes the question: is this statement true for everyone (universal scientific fact) or merely true for you (subjective)? The statement I wrote above is in the form of an if-then conditional. That is, if the if-clause of the proposition is true, we know that the then-clause of the proposition is also true. Granted, everyone might not value their cars. Some might even hate their cars. Does this, in of itself give us a reason to doubt or think that the proposition "If you value your car, you ought to change the oil"? I would argue that it does not, since such an argument is based on a special version of the fallacy called denying the antecedent. If you know that when it rains, the sidewalk will be wet and it is not currently raining, you cannot draw the conclusion that the statement "when it rains, the sidewalk will be wet" is false. Similarly, just because you do not personally value your car does not mean that you shouldn't change the oil if it is the case that you do, in fact, value your car.
Therefore, I conclude that the truth of the moral proposition "If you value your car, you ought to change the oil" is not subjective or depends on personal values and that your counter example is problematic.
I think that our apparent conflict in views may stem from how we are using terms like emptiness and existence. When I refer to something as being empty, I'm not saying that it doesn't exist, but rather that (from the perspective of what I would refer to as sacred reality) it doesn't have an independent, individual essence. It's not so much diminishing its existence as it is acknowledging that the entirety of what it is is determined by that which it is not.
Yes and no. There is a clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god (empiricism, logic, and rational thought). Comparing one concept of pantheism to another can certainly be like comparing apples to oranges, though; Spinoza and I certainly mean different things when we describe the universe as God.
I find this argument quite fascinating for several reasons.
You seem to be moving away further from mysticism and as I understand your argument, your pantheism is subject to or constrained within these various epistemologies. If your form of pantheism is subject to "empiricism, logic and rational thought" this would imply that your pantheism is subject to science and, in fact, is put forward as a scientific hypothesis of sorts. Pantheism would therefore have to be falsifiable. Can you cite any empirical discovery that would count against the basic / your pantheism conception of god? However, is it not the case that the very basics of pantheism, due to religious pluralism, can swallow, or be made consistent with any result of an empirical experiment design to falsify pantheism?
I'm unfamiliar with these terms; could you clarify them for me?
By a continuous view of the universe it is meant that you can keep dividing matter again and again and never reaching a fundamental entity that everything is made of, whereas a quantized view means that there is some basic "stuff" that cannot be divided.
All pantheist stances must, obviously, be internally coherent, but no one is claiming that the pantheisms of various schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Spinozan philosophy, the WPM, and so forth are all true
Right, well, for me it's more or less the understanding that everything is interdependent of one another. It's an understanding that applies to everything in the universe, including the universe itself, of course. You don't have to call it a god, really, that for me is just a little more of a poetic touch but at the same time, I do accept it to follow almost any definition of 'god', except for it being dynamic of course.
I also find that your contrast between sacred and profane reality is tantalizingly close to the modern distinction between natural and supernatural. Perhaps you can expand a bit on this and why you think this is not (?) the case.
My question is then, if the content of sacred reality is personal, how can it properly have normative force or connotation regarding thinking and morality? Indeed how can it be properly meaningful or have the status of incredible importance it is it merely personal or subjective?.
Further, are you arguing that the fact that sacred reality is descriptive of human thinking and action (that is, 'controls' human thinking and action)
The fact that the existence of an emergent phenomena is determined property-wise by something that does not share these properties (like liquid was viscosity but the underlying atoms themselves do not) does not imply in any shape or form that they cannot be understood or reduced to, their individual components structurally.
I personally find that from a perspective of ultimate reality, emergent properties are not so much empty but that they are a result of the combination of the most fundamental quantized entities and that they exist on a higher (yet equally non-empty) level of analysis. I still kind of get the feeling that you think that just because something is an emergent property of arrangement of fundamental entities, that this somehow diminishes the existence of them.
I would like to question part of this implication, because I find that it is borderline greedy reductionism, which we have discussed before. I agree there are profound casual connections within the universe. After all, if this was not the case, science would be impossible and all rational investigation of reality would be equally void. But I would like to argue that the fact that everything is made out of atoms and so on does not imply that entities do not posses an individual essence when viewed from a universal perspective. This individual essence would be the properties that emerges as we scale up through higher levels of analysis. I fully agree that we can say that they do not have a unique structural identity (since everything is made up out of the same basic stuff), but that this would not at all imply that they do not have a unique property-based identity.
When you say that you would not go so far as to argue that mysticism is a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god, does this mean that it is fair to say that there is no clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god, because different people and different perspectives within pantheism have different positions on this?
However, if this is the case, what does it really mean to say that you know something about the pantheist god if there is no clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god? Wouldn't all such knowledge claims ultimately be personal and subjective? Is there even a criteria for determining what ideas about the pantheist god that are more likely to be true than others? But if there is no well-defined epistemology for knowing about (your understanding of) the pantheist god, or even a criteria for which ideas are most likely, how is the pantheist god different from the dragon in Sagan's garage?
Does this involve ingesting mind-altering substances? If so, how do you determine which epiphany, if you will, is a true viewing of ultimate reality or the pantheist god, and which is just a chemical induced hallucination?
Do you think that there is no well-defined methodology for separating the two or in a broader sense, hold that there is no well defined methodology for reaching knowledge about (your understanding of) the pantheist god?
To the rest of your logical explosion argument
I believe that the post above soundly covers things, but for the sake of clarity I will re-iterate:
To act like all manifestations of pantheism are describing the one pantheist god is to succumb to equivocation. The example that most readily comes to mind is saying "the concept of God is inherently contradictory because Muslims say that God doesn't have a son but Christians do." Muslims and Christians reflect differing views on what God is, not contradictory concepts within a universal understanding of God.
All pantheist stances must, obviously, be internally coherent, but no one is claiming that the pantheisms of various schools of Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, Spinozan philosophy, the WPM, and so forth are all true. Each manifestation of pantheism must be viewed as a stand-alone philosophy. It would probably be most accurate to say that "pantheism refers to a number of independent, though often related, philosophies that conclude 'God is the universe and the universe is God,' albeit with entirely different interpretations of what this statement means."
But isn't this merely 'vegetarian' sacrality? Please refer to the ongoing discussion for context and definition.
I would find that things like surface tension or consciousness or individual people or grains of sand or quarks and neurons (they are all equally subject to sunyata IMO) exist, particularly from a worldly perspective. However, noting that their entire existence is determined by that which is not them and is fleeting in the eyes of eternity, I would also suggest that when viewed from a sacred perspective they are empty.
I find that we are drawing quite close to an almost full agreement regarding this particular part of our discussion. However, there are a few things that I would want to try to see if we cannot clarify. The fact that the existence of an emergent phenomena is determined property-wise by something that does not share these properties (like liquid was viscosity but the underlying atoms themselves do not) does not imply in any shape or form that they cannot be understood or reduced to, their individual components structurally. Maybe it is the case that your position emphasizes properties whereas my position emphasizes structure when it comes to determining if something is ultimately empty or not. I personally find that from a perspective of ultimate reality, emergent properties are not so much empty but that they are a result of the combination of the most fundamental quantized entities and that they exist on a higher (yet equally non-empty) level of analysis. I still kind of get the feeling that you think that just because something is an emergent property of arrangement of fundamental entities, that this somehow diminishes the existence of them. This will tie in to my next paragraph. However, I know you may not be explicitly saying this. As a separate line of argumentation, yet relevant to the above point, I would like to ask if you think there is some basic fundamental and quantized entity, or whether you think it is turtles all the way down, so to speak. It seems to me that this form of thinking, that is, the idea that everything is equally subject to sunyata, would imply that reality is fundamentally continuous, rather than quantized. Would you agree with this characterizations, or have I missed something here? If we assume that reality is fundamentally quantized, do you think sunyata would apply to that as well?
After all, I'm explaining my views to you with observations about the world and logical deductions from these observations (all things are fully the result of previous causes, as such all things are inherently tied to the universe and do not possess an individual essence when viewed from a universal perspective).
I would like to question part of this implication, because I find that it is borderline greedy reductionism, which we have discussed before. I agree there are profound casual connections within the universe. After all, if this was not the case, science would be impossible and all rational investigation of reality would be equally void. But I would like to argue that the fact that everything is made out of atoms and so on does not imply that entities do not posses an individual essence when viewed from a universal perspective. This individual essence would be the properties that emerges as we scale up through higher levels of analysis. I fully agree that we can say that they do not have a unique structural identity (since everything is made up out of the same basic stuff), but that this would not at all imply that they do not have a unique property-based identity. From this perspective, it would be the configurations of basic stuff that determines identity. After all, your favorite food and rotten fish is made of the exact same basic stuff, but no one would argue that this would imply that your favorite food is rotten fish.
When you say that you would not go so far as to argue that mysticism is a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god, does this mean that it is fair to say that there is no clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god, because different people and different perspectives within pantheism have different positions on this? However, if this is the case, what does it really mean to say that you know something about the pantheist god if there is no clearly defined epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god? Wouldn't all such knowledge claims ultimately be personal and subjective? Is there even a criteria for determining what ideas about the pantheist god that are more likely to be true than others? But if there is no well-defined epistemology for knowing about (your understanding of) the pantheist god, or even a criteria for which ideas are most likely, how is the pantheist god different from the dragon in Sagan's garage? You are probably aware that I am not particularly impressed by such a view, but maybe I am simply misunderstanding your perspective.
As I understand your argument, you try to move away from arguing that mysticism is a valid methodology for discovering knowledge about the pantheist god, even though you do not think that mysticism is completely inapplicable to pantheist methodology. You also speak about achieving various forms of different modes of awareness for knowing about the pantheist god. Does this involve ingesting mind-altering substances? If so, how do you determine which epiphany, if you will, is a true viewing of ultimate reality or the pantheist god, and which is just a chemical induced hallucination? Do you think that there is no well-defined methodology for separating the two or in a broader sense, hold that there is no well defined methodology for reaching knowledge about (your understanding of) the pantheist god?
I do personally believe that different people can arrive at different conclusions about pantheism that are equally valid. I believe that [...] there is a certain limit to which two views can contradict one another and be accurate, but being a pluralist I also accept that [...] a difference of views does not necessitate and incorrect view. [I'm sure you mean an incorrect view here and that and is just a spelling error - Moridin]
As we have discussed in other topics and as you probably have noticed, it is my positions that any description of any part of reality, sacred or mundane cannot under any circumstances contain contradictions if it wishes to attempt to accurately describe reality. This is because of the inherent meaninglessness of contradictory statements and because of the principle of explosion.
If I say that my cat is both black and white, this implies that I am saying that my cat is both black and not black. That is, I am asserting that my can both has the property of being black and does not have the property of being black. This means that I am claiming that "being black" is no different from "not being black". This would logically entail that claiming that something is black is cognitively meaningless, since "being black" lacks signifying traits. This is of course a simplification using logically inexact terms, but we could use square circles as a more precise example.
As for the principle of explosion, which you probably know, but I'll cover it anyways for any interested reader. This principle states that given a contradiction, anything follows. So from a contradiction, you can logically prove any statement (and its negation). This would mean that, given a contradiction, all reasoning breaks down. Please turn your attention to the following two statements.
Entity X has property P. Entity X does not have property P
If we assume that both of these are true, we can construct the following statement
"Either Entity X has property P" or "young-earth creationism is true"
This statement is logically true given the premises. Either or statements in logic is true if just one of the statements in it is true. However, since it is also true that Entity X does not have property P, we can be sure that the first part of the statement (that is, "Entity X has property P" is false). Rembmer that we have still proven that the either or statement is true, but now disproved that it cannot be the case that the first statement is true. This would logically lead us to conclude that the second statement is true, namely that
Young-earth creationism is true
Of course we can replace the proposition "young-earth creationism is true" arbitrarily to something else, like "Obama is a member of Al-qaeda", "The United States has 50 states", "The United States does not has 50 states" or "The tooth fairy exists" etc. etc.
Therefore, I cannot accept the notion that different people can reach competing, yet equally valid conclusions about the same entity (in this case, the pantheist god) if both purport to accurately describe reality. However, I do hold that it is possible for people to reach competing, yet equally (in)valid conclusions about something that has no objective grounding in reality, such as the best ice cream flavor or best color in the world, or dare I say it, properties of the various pantheist conceptions of god.
So I base my skepticism about pantheism on three basic types of arguments.
1. There is no well-defined epistemology for knowing about your/the pantheist god. 2. There is no well-defined methodology for discovering or reaching knowledge about your/the pantheist god. 3. There is a certain element, perhaps profound, of subjectivity associated with claims about pantheism and your/the pantheist conception of god.
These are sort of the same reasons why I am skeptical to things like ghosts, little green men and various other claims. Is there really a difference between your/the pantheist god and the dragon in Sagan's garage? In the latter parts of your post, you seem to be (justifiably) shying away a bit from mysticism and suggest that maybe empiricism and rationality, or maybe even science more specifically could have or does have an epistemological and methodological influence or significance for pantheism. If so, what sort of rational or empirical circumstances do you think would count against pantheism? Indeed, can there even be any rational or empirical circumstances that could count against it, as you believe that it is possible to have different or competing, yet equally valid outlooks on pantheism?
When you say "profane reality" what exactly do you mean by this? Profane to whom? Naturally, "profane reality" cannot be defined as that part of reality which is not sacred, since this would be circular given the truth of the statement "[...] definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane."
Profane reality is the mundane reality that we experience in our day to day lives. It can be meaningfully defined as the opposite of sacred reality when one considers other definitions of sacred reality (ie: specially distinctive; to a certain extent, beyond human volitional control; specially prominent with respect to human welfare; and properly determinative with respect to the beliefs, attitudes, and acts of human beings). In Eliade's terms, there is the level of reality that we normally inhibit (the profane), and there is another level of reality that is somehow distinct from this and determinative of how we should think and act (sacred reality). Whether this reality is God and His Kingdom, Tao, Nirvana, Pure Land, nearly monist non-dualism, or something else entirely, what distinguishes it is that it is different from what we normally experience and, more importantly, it somehow serves as a guideline for how we should think and act.
How do you unite your view of the universe as non-dual with your view of the universe a being partly sacred, party profane? How is it possible for the universe to be non-dual if it is a "singular divine entity that determines and transcends all phenomena that we interact with"
What do you think about my argument that mundane reality, the everyday reality that we can interact with, is also in some sense sacred, at least according to my vegetarian version of sacrality? Does this mean that sacred/mundane dichotomy is ultimately of less importance?
When you argue that "wherein all individual things are empty and impermanent aggregates wholly determined by the totality of the universe" does this mean that you think that, say, surface tension or consciousness are less real, than say quarks or neurons? I know we have talked about this earlier in this topic, but it seems to me that you are shifting perspective a bit.
Moving on to your critique of mysticism I'll simply address your specific questions, which should also handle those raised in the preceding paragraphs.
1. How is mysticism a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god? What counts as truth compared to falsehood in this epistemology?
This is not to say that I am definitively rejecting the idea of a mystical experience (ie: kensho) as helpful towards knowing the pantheist god--obviously suddenly perceiving the world in a non-dualist manner would help one to understand a non-dualist reality. It's simply that mysticism leads to an experience or observation, not necessarily a direct jump to a conclusion.
2. How is mysticism a valid methodology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god? By what method do you determine the validity of any statement about the pantheist conception of god? Can different people reach different, yet equally valid, view of the pantheist conception of god?
I do personally believe that different people can arrive at different conclusions about pantheism that are equally valid. Lao Tzu, the World Pantheist Movement, and Baruch Spinoza are all pantheists with very different beliefs as to why the universe is God and what inferences one should draw from that. I believe that, as we all inhabit the same reality, there is a certain limit to which two views can contradict one another and be accurate, but being a pluralist I also accept that, particularly in something like subjectively-defined sacrality (as opposed to something like Allah which, if actual, would objectively define sacred reality for all humans), a difference of views does not necessitate and incorrect view.
3. What exactly are "different states of awareness" (I assume you are not talking about the scientific interpretation of this)? How is the non-scientific version of this compatible, with say, the mind being the brain?
To tie back to the original topic, it seems to me that for the pantheist concept of god to actually add something valid to the concept of the universe, there has to be both a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god (or the sacredness of universe) and a methodology that can be used to reach this knowledge.
When you say "profane reality" what exactly do you mean by this? Profane to whom? Naturally, "profane reality" cannot be defined as that part of reality which is not sacred, since this would be circular given the truth of the statement "[...] definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane." How do you unite your view of the universe as non-dual with your view of the universe a being partly sacred, party profane? How is it possible for the universe to be non-dual if it is a "singular divine entity that determines and transcends all phenomena that we interact with"? Again, maybe I am just misunderstanding your approach. What do you think about my argument that mundane reality, the everyday reality that we can interact with, is also in some sense sacred, at least according to my vegetarian version of sacrality? Does this mean that sacred/mundane dichotomy is ultimately of less importance?
When you argue that sacred reality is ultimately inaccessible through things like empiricism and rationality (or maybe more precisely, that you hold that there are other epistemologies/methodologies that are better suited for understanding sacred reality instead of empiricism or rationality), I personally find this perspective (as well as other arguments below) to come tantalizingly close to the general outline of many new ages beliefs. Some even use the exact idea of "different state of awareness". There is probably no secret that I am slightly skeptical to such approaches for at least three reasons. I am going to borrow a bit of these sort of arguments from philosophical naturalist Barbra Forrest[1] but rework them for this particular viewpoint. If find that there are no well demonstrated epistemology or methodology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god that you present and there is really no objective evidence that it is possible to obtain such knowledge. You have cited mysticism as one candidate for epistemology/methodology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god / pantheist sacrality as well as attempting to reach "a different state of awareness", but it is not at all clear how knowledge is gained through mysticism or how you separate false knowledge or true knowledge with the use of mysticism. Furthermore, I find that "different state of awareness" in the context you are using it does not refer to those different states, such as coma or sleep and so on that can be determined with an EEG, but to a vague, and possible psuedoscientific, concept.
This reminds me of the Dragon in My Garage argument[2] by Carl Sagan in "The Demon-Haunted World". You have probably read it, but Sagan invites the reader to come watch a dragon in his garage. When the reader enters his garage and sees no dragon, Sagan asserts that the dragon is invisible. When the reader suggests that they use a heat detector, Sagan replies that the fire of the dragon is heatless. When the reader suggests sprinkling flower on the floor to capture the footsteps of the dragon, Sagan retorts that the dragon is flying and so on through many different types of suggestions for empirical testing. Sagan then asks rhetorically asks and answers "Now, what's the difference between an invisible, incorporeal, floating dragon who spits heatless fire and no dragon at all? If there's no way to disprove my contention, no conceivable experiment that would count against it, what does it mean to say that my dragon exists?" This was initially against a belief in ghosts and other things but perhaps we can apply it here. So, what does it mean to make claims about the world (in this case, that the universe is sacred or divine) if there is no possible way for it to be measured or tested with the tools of empiricism and rationality?
I would like to take this opportunity to ask explicitly the following three questions.
1. How is mysticism a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god? What counts as truth compared to falsehood in this epistemology? 2. How is mysticism a valid methodology for knowing about the pantheist conception of god? By what method do you determine the validity of any statement about the pantheist conception of god? Can different people reach different, yet equally valid, view of the pantheist conception of god? 3. What exactly are "different states of awareness" (I assume you are not talking about the scientific interpretation of this)? How is the non-scientific version of this compatible, with say, the mind being the brain?
To tie back to the original topic, it seems to me that for the pantheist concept of god to actually add something valid to the concept of the universe, there has to be both a valid epistemology for knowing about the pantheist god (or the sacredness of universe) and a methodology that can be used to reach this knowledge. Otherwise, I frankly see no difference between this approach and the approach of theists who believe in a personal god, yet cannot specify epistemology or methodology for the supernatural part of their worldview.
Maybe I am just misunderstanding your arguments, or reading too much into them. Perhaps you can sort me out?
[1] http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/barbara_forrest/naturalism.html [2] http://www.godlessgeeks.com/LINKS/Dragon.htm
Edit: Spell check
Isn't sacred reality just reality? I mean reality is distinctive,
What are the reasons, apart from my vegetarian reasoning, to hold the universe as sacred?
Most importantly (or perhaps most importantly after the quintessentially aspect of sacrality: differentiation from mundane reality), it is "properly determinative with respect to the beliefs, attitudes, and acts of human beings." The understanding that the reality we live is undergridded by an equally-valid non-dualist ontology wherein all individual things are empty and impermanent aggregates wholly determined by the totality of the universe is the fundamental basis for many of my beliefs, much of my attitude towards life, and subsequently, many of the actions that I take.
You are arguing that 'sacred reality' is accessible through mysticism.
Does this mean that it is inaccessible through things like empiricism and rationality?
In short, understanding something with intellect doesn't necessarily bring us to a hierophany, because it doesn't ever engage the Otherness of a form of reality distinct from the profane. Understanding sunyata is not the same as having the experience of a different reality breaking through into your own. Perhaps it would be most accurate and succinct to say I can understand my sacred reality with rationality, but to enter it I need to directly experience it through a different state of awareness.
I don't know, maybe I am just misunderstanding your argument.
While one might argue that my beliefs are also philosophical, the inclusion of a sacred reality accessible through mysticism (the approach to hierophany, or appearance of the sacred, that focuses upon certain states of mind or awareness) clearly places them in the dimension of the religious, even if they don't necessarily stem entirely from a single religion.
You are arguing that 'sacred reality' is accessible through mysticism. Does this mean that it is inaccessible through things like empiricism and rationality? If so, how are we justified in holding something as reasonable within the mysticism epistemology and what sort of methodology is used in the endeavors of mysticism? Well, I mean I do understand that humans have different states of consciousness, such as exited, relaxed, drowsy, asleep, coma or dead and so on as measured by EEG readings, but I suspect that this is not what you are referring to.
Moving on to the core of our disagreement, I think that the issue lies in different uses of the word "sacred." Like you I believe in an immanent rather than a transcendent sacrality, but what I speak of when I say "sacred" appears to be very different than what you are referring to. I am not referring to sacrality in the mere sense of something that is awe-inspiring or wondrous, but rather in the sense that the term is more commonly used in religious studies. Here, to quote Mircea Eliade (who is possibly most responsible for the focus that religious studies today places upon a sacred/ profane dichotomy), "The first possible definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane."
Using the definition of one of my old textbooks (which is probably about as good or better than anything that I would come up with on my own), "Sacred reality is always considered specially distinctive; to a certain extent, beyond human volitional control; specially prominent with respect to human welfare; and properly determinative with respect to the beliefs, attitudes, and acts of human beings." The holistic conception of the universe isn't merely an idea that I find to be sublime; it is a reality that forms the bedrock of many of my beliefs and how I chose to approach and live my life.
Well, maybe, but do we have to call it god for that? >_<
Your surface tension and rainbow argument. How is it relevant? Well you basically said that at atomic (not molecular) level we don't see any signs of an emerging scenario of surface tension? Did i just read a gross over simplification in two posts of an attempt at mutual refutations of what could have been an atrocious exchange of views. (not that i prefer it that way).
It is relevant insofar as it discusses the ontological status of emergent phenomena. I may be misinterpreting this perspective, but it seems to me that his position diminishes the ontological significance of emergent phenomena, something that he did touch upon and did agree that emergent phenomena does to some degree have ontological significance, but in a lesser way, which I was a bit skeptical towards. I would argue that surface tension is as real as the atoms it consists of.