Quote: from Descartes at 5:09 pm on July 6, 2009 Do you believe that we have free will? That we have the ability to make choices. Or do you believe that we are all just victims to cause and effect, and that causality is the only truth. Or are we pre-determined by some sort of higher power? Freewill and causality are not mutually exclusive possibilities.
Do you believe that we have free will? That we have the ability to make choices. Or do you believe that we are all just victims to cause and effect, and that causality is the only truth. Or are we pre-determined by some sort of higher power?
Freewill and causality are not mutually exclusive possibilities.
Care to elaborate? Or do you wish to simply leave it at that.
However, a hard determinist would probably argue that he doesn't understand how the freedom to act in accordance with your values qualifies as freedom in the morally important sense. I am very interested in hearing this perspective.
I'm a compatibilist and hold that freedom in the morally important sense presupposes that our actions are caused by who we are, what we value and what the world around us is. It is my position that freedom in the morally important sense is the ability to act on your values.
I agree with you here; and I'll elaborate:
We are only held responsible for our actions because we act in accordance to values which we hold. If a value that we hold is morally reprehensible, then we are held responsible for whatever we do because of it. Whether or not we have chosen our morals or have simply acquired them is of no consequence, the fact is that there is an agent that holds such-and-such morals, which is capable of acting on them. That alone justifies our being responsible for our actions; we are the vessel through which "we" can act on our morals.
I understand the argument of those who would claim that if we are simply aggregates of experiences and stimuli that we are not responsible for any actions, but they argue that there is no agent. I argue that the agent IS the aggregate whole. We place responsibility on the moral agent, regardless of how he came to possess the ability to act on morals, in my opinion. Life may not be fair to that extent, but then, we weren't given the choice of whether or not to be born either. If we wish to accept the gift of life, then we must accept the responsibilities that come with it; namely that we are responsible for who we become, even though it is not our own fault.
A person may go through a serious trauma as a child and develop into a serial murderer. Had that event not traumatized the child, he might have developed into a normal, peaceful adult. Is it his fault that his experiences reacted violently with his psychology? I'd say not; but that does not change the fact that he is in fact a serial murderer, and that his nature is to be sociopathic. He is at fault for his actions, whether or not he is at fault for how he came to have such a personality.
I'm sure there are some flaws to this reasoning; please point them out if you find any. I'd like very much to try to understand this better myself.
Some people do not like the idea of out actions being determined, but contemplate the alternative. If nothing in you, from your emotions, moral character, your thoughts, memories or your knowledge about the world caused you to behave in the way you did, how can you be responsible for your actions?
Quote: from Event Horizon at 8:17 am on July 7, 2009 I am a compatibilist. I think any definition of "Free will" that does not take into account causality is absurd and unusable. Choices must, by their nature, have causes--otherwise they are random. Thus, any definition of free will must account for the causes behind any and all decisions. The way I see it, the complexity of the human brain is what allows us our "free will". I am a determinist, and I believe that our personalities, our concerns, our feelings toward others, everything is determined by outside causes. I believe that we can reflect on our thoughts and change our minds [i.e. internal causes] but that these actions, too, are the result of external factors. However: 1. I am everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. 2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see, what thinks I experience, etc] 3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of external factors. 4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I" 5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition. here is the crux 6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will? It is true, then, that all decisions made by "I" are completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition. I don't see where agency arises in the embodied "I." If the "I" is a result of external forces, causally determined right down to the beginning of the universe (given hypothetically that one has the knowledge to trace such a history), how could "I" do otherwise than what has been predicted quite literally in the stars? This to me is no agency at all.
I am a compatibilist. I think any definition of "Free will" that does not take into account causality is absurd and unusable. Choices must, by their nature, have causes--otherwise they are random. Thus, any definition of free will must account for the causes behind any and all decisions. The way I see it, the complexity of the human brain is what allows us our "free will". I am a determinist, and I believe that our personalities, our concerns, our feelings toward others, everything is determined by outside causes. I believe that we can reflect on our thoughts and change our minds [i.e. internal causes] but that these actions, too, are the result of external factors. However: 1. I am everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc. 2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see, what thinks I experience, etc] 3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of external factors. 4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I" 5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition. here is the crux 6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will? It is true, then, that all decisions made by "I" are completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.
The way I see it, the complexity of the human brain is what allows us our "free will". I am a determinist, and I believe that our personalities, our concerns, our feelings toward others, everything is determined by outside causes. I believe that we can reflect on our thoughts and change our minds [i.e. internal causes] but that these actions, too, are the result of external factors.
However: 1. I am everything I see, do, hear, touch, feel, know, think, experience, etc.
2. Those things are determined by external factors [I cannot choose what I see, what thinks I experience, etc]
3. Thus, "I" am a being created as a result of external factors.
4. When speaking of "will" we necessarily imply a being which will be doing the willing. I.e. "I"
5. Thus, the question of personal free will asks if "I" --a being created qua external factors-- can make decisions of my own volition.
here is the crux
6. SO. If "I" am every single factor and influence that I have ever experienced, and any decision I make comes directly from those experiences and nothing else [how could it?], then were comes the external forces that would take away free will?
It is true, then, that all decisions made by "I" are completely free of outside forces. "I" will act exactly how "I" will act, and no different. But "I" act freely and of "my" own volition.
I don't see where agency arises in the embodied "I." If the "I" is a result of external forces, causally determined right down to the beginning of the universe (given hypothetically that one has the knowledge to trace such a history), how could "I" do otherwise than what has been predicted quite literally in the stars? This to me is no agency at all.
I have already noted that "I" will never do anything other than what "I" want to. But I have also pointed out that that is sufficient. If "I" am the result of a set of experiences and factors that are not my control; and those same things are what determine my choices, then it is "I" who determine my choices. I am not arguing that there is an agent apart from the causal chain that has freedom of will; I am arguing that the meaning behind "I" is such that free will is compatible with determinism.
I am a completely deterministic creature; and yet I also have the freedom to do as "I" please. How free do you want free will? Any more liberal and you will have an absurd definition--which is to say, it is absurd to say that I should be able to do what I do not, in fact, want to do.
The debate here is not whether outside forces deprive an "I" of free will or somehow snatch it away, the debate centers on whether or not free will can arise given the truth of determinism.
I believe it is more of an argument of what free will actually means. If we don't have a coherent definition for free will, then how can we answer your question?
But if you believe that free will can obtain given determinism, you are a compatibilist and your task appears to be to make free will work with determinism. I believe it can if both sides are willing to make concessions. I'll go into this position later.
concessions? Really? I'd like to see this argument.
You find compatibilist definitions morally and aesthetically distasteful over the absurd abstractions of the hard determinist?
I'm definitely a member of the hard-for-determinism club. Of course I'm also a soft determinist when it comes to the definitions of free will used by compatibilists, but I find those definitions distasteful on moral and aesthetic grounds and generally rather slimy, though I recognise them as a valiant attempt to resolve the logical absurdities inherent in truly free will.
Of course I'm also a soft determinist when it comes to the definitions of free will used by compatibilists, but I find those definitions distasteful on moral and aesthetic grounds and generally rather slimy, though I recognise them as a valiant attempt to resolve the logical absurdities inherent in truly free will.
The debate here is not whether outside forces deprive an "I" of free will or somehow snatch it away, the debate centers on whether or not free will can arise given the truth of determinism. If you believes it can't, you're an incompatibilist libertarian who believes free will cannot obtain given determinism and therefore must reject the truth of determinism. The incompatibilists task becomes one of both attempting to show the falsity of determinism and of trying to conceptualize a free will in an undetermined universe. But if you believe that free will can obtain given determinism, you are a compatibilist and your task appears to be to make free will work with determinism. I believe it can if both sides are willing to make concessions. I'll go into this position later.
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